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Implications of rational inattention 
The majority of macro models currently in use assume that the market players 
have rational expectations and can process information immediately and without 
restrictions. These assumptions are justified, first, in that they make the models 
easier to solve. Second, the Lucas critique negates certain forms of limited rational 
expectations. Rational expectations and the unrestricted ability to process 
information also imply, however, that prices and market players’ behaviour adapt 
quickly and without error to new information. Yet this does not match what is 
generally observed in reality. At the same time, numerous empirical studies show 
that market players’ expectations are not rational in many cases. 
Recently, theories have been developed that model imperfect information and 
deviations from rational expectations or cost-inducing information procurement 
and processing and study their implications. This includes, for example, learning
literature (eg Sargent (1993), Evans und Honkapohja (2001)), robust control 
literature (eg Hansen and Sargent (2001), Giannoni (1999)) and behavioural 
economics literature (eg Laibson (1997), Benábou and Tirole (2001)). This paper 
is a contribution to this corpus of literature and adopts another way of modelling 
imperfect information of market players. It assumes that the market players have 
limited capacities to process information if shocks hit the economy and the market 
players receive and analyse signals. In this work the author makes use of the 
coding theory developed by engineering science. This is based on the idea that 
information initially flows through a “channel” before it reaches the market players. 
Depending on the degree of capacity to process information, it may then be 
fraught with errors which, in turn, influence the decisions of the market players. 
The advantage of this approach over the more psychological approaches in some 
of the recent literature is that it develops predictions about deviations from perfect 
optimizing behavior from a minimal set of assumptions, without reliance on 
possibly controversial psychological detail.  Its advantage over approaches that 
simply postulate “measurement error” in people's observations is that the form of 
observation errors is predicted by the theory, from the structure of people's 
optimization problems.Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung 
Implikationen rationaler Unaufmerksamkeit 
Die Mehrzahl der gegenwärtigen Makromodelle nimmt an, dass die Marktteilnehmer 
rationale Erwartungen haben und Informationen sofort und ohne Einschränkungen 
verarbeiten können. Diese Annahmen werden zum einen dadurch gerechtfertigt, dass 
so die Modelle einfacher zu lösen sind. Zum anderen verneint die Lucas Kritik 
bestimmte Formen begrenzter rationaler Erwartungen. Rationale Erwartungen und die 
unbegrenzte Fähigkeit, Informationen zu verarbeiten, implizieren aber auch, dass 
Marktteilnehmer und Preise schnell und ohne Fehler neue Informationen verarbeiten. 
Das trifft in der Realität aber im allgemeinen nicht zu. Gleichzeitig zeigen viele 
empirische Untersuchungen, dass die Erwartungen der Marktteilnehmer oft nicht 
rational sind. 
In neuerer Zeit sind Theorien entwickelt worden, die unvollständige Informationen und 
Abweichungen von rationalen Erwartungen modellieren oder auch die Beschaffung 
kostenträchtiger Informationen und die die sich daraus ergebenden Implikationen 
studieren. Dazu gehört z. B. die Literatur über das Lernen (siehe Sargent, 1993 und 
Evans und Honkapohja, 2001), die Literatur zur robusten Steuerung  (siehe Hansen und 
Sargent, 2001, Giannoni, 1999) und die Literatur zum ökonomischen Verhalten (siehe 
Laibson, 1997, Benabou und Tirole, 2001). Dieses Papier ist ein Beitrag zu dieser 
Literatur; es beschreitet aber  einen anderen Weg, um unvollständige Informationen von 
Marktteilnehmer abzubilden. Es nimmt an, dass die Marktteilnehmer begrenzte 
Fähigkeiten haben, Informationen zu verarbeiten, wenn Schocks die Volkswirtschaft 
treffen und die Marktteilnehmer Signale empfangen und verarbeiten. In dieser Arbeit 
verwendet der Verfasser die Kodierungstheorie der Ingenieurswissenschaften. Sie 
basiert auf der Idee, dass Informationen zunächst durch einen Kanal fließen, bevor sie 
beim Marktteilnehmer ankommen. Je nachdem welche Kapazität zur Verfügung steht, 
um Informationen zu verarbeiten, kann sie mit Fehlern belastet sein, die dann die 
Entscheidungen der Marktteilnehmer beeinflussen. 
Der Vorteil dieses Ansatzes gegenüber einigen mehr psychologischen Ansätzen 
besteht darin, dass er Voraussagen über die Abweichungen vom perfekten 
optimierenden Verhalten macht und dabei mit einer geringen Anzahl von Annahmen 
auskommt und nicht auf psychologische Details angewiesen ist, die möglicherweise umstritten sind. Der Vorteil gegenüber der einfachen Annahme von Messfehlern in den 
Beobachtungen besteht darin, dass die Form des Beobachtungsfehlers von der Theorie 
erklärt werden und von der Struktur des Optimierungsproblems der Menschen 
abgeleitet werden kann.  RATIONAL INATTENTION
RATIONAL INATTENTION: A RESEARCH AGENDA
CHRISTOPHER A. SIMS
ABSTRACT. The literature applying information-theoretic ideas to economics has
so far considered only Gaussian uncertainty. Ex post Gaussian uncertainty can be
justiﬁed as optimal when the associated optimization problem is linear-quadratic,
but the literature has often assumed Gaussian uncertainty even where it cannot
be justiﬁed as optimal. This paper considers a simple two-period optimal saving
problem with a Shannon capacity constraint and non-quadratic utility. It derives
an optimal ex post probability density for wealth in two leading cases (log and lin-
ear utility) and lays out a general approach for handling other cases numerically. It
displays and discusses numerical solutions for other utility functions, and consid-
ers the feasibility of extending this paper’s approaches to general non-LQ dynamic
programming problems. The introduction of the paper discusses approaches that
have been taken in the existing literature to applying Shannon capacity to eco-
nomic modeling, making criticisms and suggesting promising directions for fur-
ther progress.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a pair of earlier papers
1 I have argued for modeling the observed inertial re-
action of economic agents to external information of all kinds as arising from an
inability to attend to all the information available, and for treating that inability as
arising fromﬁnite Shannon capacity. Shannon capacity is a measure of information
ﬂow rate that is inherently probabilistic. It uses the reduction in the entropy of a
probability distribution as the measure of information ﬂow. The entropy of a dis-
tribution is a global measure of the uncertainty implied by the distribution, relative
to some base distribution. Because of this dependence on the base, the entropy of a
distribution is not uniquely deﬁned, but if we consider the joint distribution of two
random vectors or variables, the expected reduction in entropy of one of the two
achieved by observing the other of the two, the mutual information implied by
the joint distribution, is uniquely deﬁned, independent of any base. This measure
Date: August 18, 2005.
This research was supported in part by NSF grant SES-0350686. The paper was originally pre-
pared for and presented at the Deutsche Bundesbank Spring Conference, May 2005.
1(Sims,2003,1998). TheearlierpapercontainsanappendixarguingthatShannoncapacitymakes
sense as a model of inattention. The later one gives explicit solutions for some simple economic
models with a linear-quadratic structure.
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of mutual information can be derived from a few reasonable axioms, but it is per-
vasive less because of its axiomatic appeal than because has proved to be exactly
the concept appropriate for studying information ﬂows in physical communica-
tion channels. A Shannon “channel” is a set of possible inputs, a set of possible
outputs, and a conditional distribution for outputs given inputs. From these ele-
ments, it is possible to calculate a tight upper bound for the mutual information
between inputs and outputs, which is called the channel’s capacity. It is the mea-
sure of information ﬂow we use in characterizing modems or internet connections
in bits per second or bytes per second. Shannon showed that no matter what we
might wish to send through the channel, whether music, text, or spreadsheets, and
no matter what the physical nature of the channel — wires, optical cables, radio
transmission, or a messenger service — it is possible to send information through
the channel at a rate arbitrarily close to capacity.
Economists, particularly macroeconomists, have recognized the need to account
fortheinertiainobservedeconomicbehaviorandhavemodeleditwithavarietyof
devices — menu costs, adjustment costs, information delay, implementation delay,
etc. As my two earlier papers argued, these mechanisms can match the observed
pattern — slow, smooth cross-variable responses, combined with less smooth id-
iosyncratic randomness — only by postulating elaborate inertial schemes that are
bothdifﬁculttoconnect toobservationor intuitionandcritically importantin mak-
ing model behavior realistic. One appeal of the rational inattention idea (that is,
of modeling agents as ﬁnite-capacity channels) is that it can in principle explain
the observed patterns of inertial and random behavior by a mechanism with many
fewer free parameters. Another is that it ﬁts well with intuition; most people every
day encounter, or could very easily encounter, much more information that is in
principle relevant to their economic behavior than they actually respond to. The
notion that this is because their are limits to “attention”, and that such limits might
behave like ﬁnite Shannon capacity, is intuitively appealing.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LITERATURE
Anumberofrecentpapersinmacroeconomicsandﬁnancehaveusedinformation-
theoreticideas(Ma´ ckowiak and Wiederholt,2005;Luo,2004;Mondria,2005;Moscarini,
2004;Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp,2004a,b;Peng and Xiong,2005;Peng,2005).
While these papers develop some valuable insights, it is worth noting that they
have made assumptions, to allow tractable modeling, that are hard to defend and
can lead to anomalous results. Some of these limitations are common to all or
nearly all of the papers.
II.1. Not allowing fully endogenous choice of the form of uncertainty. It is cen-
tral to the idea of modeling individuals as capacity-constrained that the nature,
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not just the quantity of their uncertainty about external signals (prices, income,
wealth, asset yields, etc.) is subject to choice. The power of information theoretic
ideas arises from the fact that the available joint stochastic processes for channel
input and channel output are, to an arbitrarily good approximation, limited only
by the capacity of the channel, not by its physical nature. In a model of an opti-
mizing agent, the agents’ objective function will therefore determine the stochastic
process for the joint behavior of actions and external signals. The articles cited in
the previous paragraph, with the partial exception of Luo’s, postulate directly a
simple parameteric form for this joint process, without deriving that form from
the model’s objective function.
To be more speciﬁc, the papers all assume Gaussian prior uncertainty about a
state variable and Gaussian posterior (after information ﬂow) uncertainty. Fur-
thermore, in some cases they assume that the prior and posterior uncertainty is
over a random vector and is i.i.d., either over the elements of the vector itself or
over a set of factors that generate the distribution of the vector. (Luo and Mondria
do consider endogenous choice of posterior covariance structure.) It is true that
Gaussian posterior uncertainty can be shown to be optimal when the loss function
is quadratic, but only Luo’s paper considers cases of pure quadratic loss. Even if
the loss function is quadratic, it is not generally optimal for a capacity-constrained
agent to have i.i.d. posterior uncertainty across the same variables or factors that
wereapriorii.i.d. Aswewillseeinsomeexamplesbelow, standardformsofutility
functions in an economic model generate strongly non-Gaussian forms of optimal
posterior uncertainty.
II.2. Back-door information ﬂows. Several of the papers develop market equilib-
ria, and to avoid complications assume that market prices are observed without
error. But in these equilibria market prices are information-carrying random vari-
ables. Assuming they can be observed without error amounts to assuming un-
bounded information-processing capacity.
2 Counter-intuitive results can emerge
whenweassumeperfectobservationofpricescombinedwithcapacity-constrained
observation of some other source of information.
II.3. Distinguishing human information use, costly external information trans-
mission and costly investigation. The models in Sims (2003) and those presented
below in this paper are motivated by the idea that information that is freely avail-
able to an individual may not be used, because of the individual’s limited infor-
mation processing capacity. That capacity is unitary, allocatable to control many
2An inﬁnitely long sequence of digits can carry an inﬁnite amount of information. Such a se-
quence, with a decimal point in front of it, is a real number. So if I can transmit an arbitrary real
number without error in ﬁnite time, I have an inﬁnite-capacity channel.
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dimensions of uncertainty the individual faces. The “price” of this information is
the shadow price of capacity in the individual’s overall optimization problem.
Individuals or ﬁrms may also choose Shannon capacities of periodical subscrip-
tions, telephone lines, internet connections, and other “wiring” that brings in in-
formation from the outside world. For a ﬁnancial ﬁrm with a large staff constantly
active in many markets, the wiring costs of information may indeed be more im-
portant, or at least comparable to, the costs of mapping information, once it is
on the premises, into human action. However for most individuals, wiring costs
are likely to be small relative to the costs associated with human information pro-
cessing. In any case the costs of the two kind of information will generally be quite
distinct, on a per-bit basis. One can’t replace the human decision-making that links
prices, incomes and wealth to real actions with a ﬁber-optic cable.
Both wiring and internal human information processing are reasonably mea-
sured in bits, with costs linear, or at least smooth, in bits. There is another kind
of “information”, however, whose cost is different, and probably usually not well
measured in bits. In the stock market, an individual investor has a vast amount
of information about individual stocks available at practically no or trivial cost, in
newspapersandontheinternet. Itislikelythathedoesnotuseallthisinformation,
due to limited information processing capacity. But it is also possible to develop
information through costly investigation — interviewing experts in a ﬁrm’s tech-
nical area, conducting surveys of consumers to determine their reactions to the
company’s product, etc. The CEO of a drug company might contemplate approv-
ing a clinical trial to determine whether or not a new drug is an improvement on
existing treatments, approving a focus group investigation of which of two pack-
ages is most preferred by consumers, or stepping outside to see if it’s raining. Each
of these three actions would (if the answers had 50-50 probability in advance) yield
one bit of information. But it is no help to decision making to think of them as bits
limited by a capacity constraint.
Several of the ﬁnance-oriented papers cited above consider at least some models
in which uncertainty about an asset’s yield is quantiﬁed as the standard deviation
of its distribution, and information costs are quantiﬁed as bits, measured by re-
duction in the log of the standard deviation. But this is only appropriate if the
information is thought of as freely available, with only wiring costs or human ca-
pacity costs preventing it from being known with certainty. In asset markets this
is almost never the case. Sophisticated, continuously trading investors have un-
certainty that is dominated by information that is not freely available, and less
sophisticated investors, who do fail to use instantly all freely available informa-
tion, do not have the option of reducing the log standard error of their uncertainty
about yields to arbitrarily low levels according to a linear cost schedule.
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Whilefailure to make these distinctions does not necessarily make a model unin-
teresting, it can make a model’s interpretation difﬁcult. Especially in highly liquid
ﬁnancial markets, It is probably important to recognize that wiring capacity and
human information-processing capacity have different costs. It is certainly impor-
tant to to distinguish information about asset returns that is freely available but
costly to act upon from information that can be obtained only through costly in-
vestigation.
III. MOVING BEYOND THE LQ GAUSSIAN CASE
For some purposes linear-quadratic Gaussian (LQG) models may give reason-
able approximations. Luo (2004) applies information-theoretic ideas to optimiza-
tion problems with linearized ﬁrst order conditions as are commonly used recently
in macroeconomic modeling. The idea is that if uncertainty is fairly small, lin-
ear approximations to the model’s FOC’s may be quite accurate, so that the LQG
framework remains an adequate approximation even with capacity constraints.
While this is an idea worth pursuing, because it yields insights and is tractable,
there is reason to worry about its range of applicability. If rational inattention is
to explain much of observed inertia in behavior, people must be using a small
part of their capacity to monitor economic variables. But in this case information-
processing based uncertainty will be large, and this in itself will tend to undermine
the accuracy of the local LQG approximation. Also, there are many interesting is-
sues, like the interaction of ﬁnite capacity with the degree of risk aversion that is
investigated below, that cannot be studied in an LQG framework.
In this section, therefore, we show that moving beyond the LQG framework is
feasible. We consider several variations on a simple two-period saving problem.
The problem is so simple that the information ﬂows we will be looking at are un-
realistically low. Nonetheless it is interesting to see that the model provides some
insights into behavior, is computationally manageable, and suggests that a more












f(c,w) ≥ 0 (2)
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0<c<w































· g(w)dw ≤ κ . (4)
The expression (1) is a standard assertion that we are maximizing expected utility,
where that is the sum of the expected utility of current consumption, logc, and that
of next period’s consumption, log(w − c). (We could include a gross interest rate
greater than one and a discount factor less than one without changing anything
important.) What is unusual is that the “choice variable” with respect to which we
maximize is not current consumption c, but the joint pdf of c with wealth w. The
constraint (2) recognizes that f = 0 puts us at the boundary of feasible values for
probability densities. The constraint (3) tells us that the marginal distribution of
wealthisﬁxed, soallthatisavailableforchoiceis f(c,w)/g(w), theconditionalpdf
of c given w. The information constraint is (4). The last term in (4) is the entropy of
the marginal distribution of w, the next to last term is the entropy of the marginal
distribution of c, and their sum is what the entropy of c and w’s joint distribution
would be if they were independent. The ﬁrst term is minus the entropy of the
actual joint distribution determined by f. The the three terms together form the
mutual information between c and w. This is also the expected reduction in the
entropy of the w distribution from observing c, and also the expected reduction in
the entropy of the c distribution from observing w.
The ﬁrst order condition for the problem is
log










+ µ(w)+ψ(c,w) . (5)
Here µ is the Lagrange multiplier on (3) and ψ(c,w) is a stand-in for the fact
that when f = 0, the FOC’s do not have to hold. (Since at f = 0 we will have
log f = −∞, no ﬁnite value of ψ(c,w) makes the FOC hold when log(c · (w − c)) is
ﬁnite, but the non-convexity of the constraint set means that solutions on the f = 0
boundary can nonetheless occur at such c,w values.) If we let q(w | c) denote the
conditional pdf of w given c, α = 1/λ, and ν(w)=e−αµ(w), this expression can, at
points where f > 0, be rearranged as
q(w | c)=ν(w)cα(w − c)α . (6)
The function ν must, according to (6), make the integral of the right-hand side with
respect to w one, regardless of the value of c. One ν that works (the only one?) is a ν
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ν0w−2α−1cα(w − c)α dw = ν0
 ∞
0
(v + 1)−2α−1c−2α−1cαvαcαcdv. (7)
Since the terms in c cancel, the integral does not depend on c, and by choosing ν0
properly we can make the integral one.
The form of the integrand in (7)is proportionalto that of an F(2α+2,2α) density.
Normalized to have constant spread, this does approach normality as α = 1/λ ap-
proaches inﬁnity, i.e. as the shadow price of information in utility units approaches
zero. The peak is at (2 − 1/(α − 1))c, the mean at (2 + 1/(α − 1))c, for α > 1. The
distribution is more tightly concentrated around w = 2c the larger is α = 1/λ.
In other words, as the shadow price λ on the information constraint declines, we
come closer and closer to the certainty solution.
Figure 1 shows a contour map of the pdf of w | c for a case where λ = .5. Note
that the conditional distribution of w | c in this case is centered roughly at 2c,a s
we expect. The solid line on the ﬁgure shows the value of c that would be chosen
under certainty, w/2, and the dotted line shows c = w, which is the lower bound
on w for a given c.
Figure 2 displays these conditional densities in a different way. Each line shows
q(w | c) for a different value of c between zero and .5. These are all of course
truncated, scaled F densities. They have all been scaled to integrate to 1 over the
(0,1) interval, to make them comparable to numerically derived densities we will
show below.
As is true for the LQ case, we ﬁnd here that the form of the distribution for
w conditional on available information at decision time is invariant to g(w), the
marginal pdf for w before information ﬂow, so long as the density has full support.
This is not to say that the conditional distribution itself is invariant to g.I fg has
high entropy, then with a given κ it will not be possible to reduce entropy much,
λ will be large, and the α parameter that determines how close c is to w/2 will be
small. But there is a single parameter, λ, that controls all the possible variation in
the form of the distribution of w | c when f has full support.
The ﬁrst-order conditions need not hold at points where the joint pdf f(c,w) is
zero. Obviously if g(w) is zero over some range, f(c,w) must also be zero over the
corresponding range of w values. Even where g(w) has the whole non-negative
real line as its support, it is possible for p(c) to emerge as zero over some set of
c values and indeed even possible for the marginal distribution of c to emerge as
discrete. If the conditional distributions of c given w has, over any set of w’s with
non-zero probability, discrete weight on points that do not have discrete weight

















But so long as any c values getting discrete weight in the conditional distributions
also have discrete weight in the marginal, the information ﬂow is ﬁnite. Of course
at discrete values of c that have non-zero probability, the ﬁrst-order conditions of
the problem hold, so for these c’s, as for any others with positive density value,
we expect q(w | c) to take on the form we derived above, over its support. It is
possible, though, for q(w | c) to have less then full support. This obviously allows
deviation from the F distribution we derived above, but of a particular form, since
it must have the shape of an F density over its support.
While the distribution of w | c is easy to characterize here, it is not easy (for
me, anyway) to characterize the distribution of c | w, even in the case where the
marginal on w is assumed to have the same scaled-F form as the post-observation
distribution for savings, or to ﬁnd a form for the marginal of c that, together with
the known form for w | c, implies that the marginal for w is a scaled F. However
this is just a very simple example. Fully dynamic models are likely to generate
distributions complicated enough to require numerical methods for solution in
any case.
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We can see an analytic solution for one other simple special case: where the util-
ity function is linear and the c < w constraint is maintained.3 If the utility function
is undiscounted, so U(c,w)=c + w − c = w, the problem has the trivial solution
c = 0, with no information at all used. The problem is a little more interesting if
utility is discounted, so U = c + β(w − c) with 0 < β < 1. For any U, the FOC’s
take the same form as (5), but with U(c,w) replacing the log function on the left of
the equality. For this linear case, the analog of (6) is
q(w | c)=v(w)eα(βw+(1−β)c) (8)
By choosing v(w) proportional to e−αw, we get this in a form that, when integrated
from c to ∞ w.r.t. w, gives a constant value. The implied form for the conditional
pdf of u = w − c given c is α(1 − β)e−α(1−β)u. Here we can note that as α increases
(soinformationisﬂowingmorefreely)thesolutionconvergestoward c = w, which
is the optimum without uncertainty. It is also interesting that c and w are implied
3Without the c < w constraint, and with discounting, agents who can borrow at zero interest
will obviously push c to inﬁnity.
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to be independent conditional on any rectangle inside the w > c region. These risk-
neutral agents waste no capacity on matching c to w itself, except as it contributes
toward knowing where the w = c boundary is.
In the model with log utility, capacity-constrained agents have expected wealth,
given their consumption, that exceeds the level corresponding to the deterministic
solution w = 2c. Thehigherareinformationcosts(theloweriscapacity), thelonger
is the tail on the w | c distribution and the larger the excess E[w | c] − 2c. There
is an effect that seems to go in the opposite direction, of course: the mode of the
w | c distribution falls further below the deterministic value as information costs
increase. However when data are aggregated across many individuals in different
circumstances, we would expect the expectation result to dominate. We thus see a
“precautionary savings due to information costs” effect.
But notice that the model with linear utility produces the opposite result. These
risk-neutral agents who discount the future, while facing a gross rate of return of
1, are constrained from consuming all their wealth in the ﬁrst period only by their
uncertainty about what what that total wealth is. Relaxing their capacity constraint
produces less saving.
With quadratic utility, the left-hand side of (5) is quadratic. Normalizing the
utility function to U(c,w)=c − 1
2c2 +(w − c) − 1
2(w −c)2 leads to the analog of (6)
as
q(w | c)=v(w)eα(w−(c2+(w−c)2)/2) . (9)
If we drop the c < w constraint and also the c > 0 constraint, the right-hand-side
of (9) as a function of w is proportional to a Gaussian pdf with variance 1/α, with
only the mean of the distribution dependent on c. Hence we can make the right-
hand-side’s integral one by choosing v(w) to be constant. It is then easy to verify
that if the exogenously speciﬁed marginal pdf for w, g(w), is Gaussian, the joint
pdf for c and w is Gaussian. Observe that whatever g(w) we start with, so long
as it allows a solution with f > 0 everywhere, the conditional distribution of w
is Gaussian. Thus if this problem were part of a recursive scheme, all the joint
distributions of successive c’s and w’s after the ﬁrst period would be Gaussian.
However, this result depends crucially on there being no c < w or c > 0r e -
striction. With these restrictions, despite the form of (9), the dependence of limits
of integration on c will require at least a non-constant v(w), and possibly some
regions of f = 0.
So we can conclude from these examples:
• A hard budget constraint is not incompatible with a ﬁnite rate of informa-
tion ﬂow. The conditional distribution of c | w can be conﬁned to the (0,w)
interval, even though observation of neither c nor w ever gives perfect in-
formation about the other variable. An agent behaving this way would be
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making decisions that only imperfectly determine c, based on his imperfect
knowledge of w. For example, writing checks or using credit cards and oc-
casionally ﬁnding that the account is overdrawn, or getting to the checkout
counter of the grocery store and realizing he will have to put a few things
back, or buying $10 worth of gasoline without ﬁguring out in advance how
many gallons that will be.
• Uncertainty arising from information processing can easily be quite non-
normal, even when exogenous shocks are small. In this example, there are
no exogenous shocks. Normality is a good approximation only when the
information constraint is not having a strong effect.
• A capacity constraint can have powerful implications for savings behavior.
This accords with the facts that most people only vaguely aware of their
net worth, are little-inﬂuenced in their current behavior (at least if under
50) by the status of their retirement account, and can be induced to make
large changes in savings behavior by minor “informational” changes, like
changes in default options on retirement plans.
IV. SOME MODELS THAT REQUIRE A COMPUTATIONAL APPROACH
I have no recipe for exhaustively identifying cases like log utility, linear utility,
and quadratic utility without borrowing constraints, in which an analytic solution
for q(w | c) is obtainable. Indeed I have the impression that such cases are very
rare. So it is worthwhile to look at some examples of commonly used U(x,y)
functions and see how hard it is to compute solutions.
For an f > 0 solution, the ﬁrst-order conditions and the constraint that the mar-
ginal pdf for w be the given g(w) lead to the pair of equations

eαU(c,w)v(w)dw = 1, all c, (10)

h(c)eαU(c,w)v(w)dc = g(w) , all w , (11)
which have to be solved for v and h, where h is the marginal pdf of c. This is
a recursive linear system. It looks like we could discretize it, solve the resulting
simple linear system from (10) for v, then use those results in (11) to create another
simple linear equation system to solve for h. This approach does not work.
Each of these equations is what is known as a Fredholm integral equation of type
1, which are notoriously ill-conditioned except in special cases. In other words, a
v that makes the norm of the vector of discrepancies between right and left hand
sides of (10) nearly zero, can differ from the true solution in v-space by a large
amount. Furthemore, it is not going to be uncommon for there to be regions of
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c,w space with f(c,w)=0 in the solution. If one knew where these were, (10-
11) could be used on the remaining c,w values. But in general we will not know
where they are, and searching over all the possible combinations of such regions is
prohibitively complicated.
An approach that I have found to work is simply to discretize f itself and maxi-
mize the Lagrangian






with λ ﬁxed at some positive number. Here H(W,C) is the mutual information
between w and c in their joint distribution, the same object that appears on the left-
hand side of the information constraint (4). This can work because points at which
f = 0 simply drop out of both the information constraint and the expected utility.
I have imposed f > 0 by maximizing over log f as the parameter vector. This
means of course that the parameters corresponding to f(c,w)=0 values are ill-
determined, but gradient-based search methods (at least my own, csminwel.R,
which is what I used) still perform well, converging nicely for the f(c,w) > 0
values and leaving log f extremely negative at points where clearly f(c,w)=0.
The discretized solutions below all are based on using an equi-spaced grid with
16 c values ranging from .01 to .5 and 31 w values ranging from .02 to 1. The
marginal pdf g for w is given in each case as g(w)=2w. There are then 31 adding-
up constraints, and 8 × 15 = 120 zero constraints on points where c > w, leaving
31×16−120−31 = 345 free parameters. The speciﬁc normalization I used was an
unconstrained 15 × 31 matrix θ of parameters, with the entry fij of the discretized
f determined as gj exp

θi−1,j)/(1 + ¯ θ)

for i > 1 and as gj/(1 + ¯ θ) for i = 1, and
with ¯ θ = ∑i exp(θij).
Though for some problems 345 parameters would be so many as to raise compu-
tational difﬁculties, here there seems to be no trouble with them. Using interpreted
(in the R language4) code and numerical derivatives, convergence is achieved in
about 450 iterations, with each iteration taking about 1.5 seconds (making the
whole computation take about 11 minutes) on a 3GHz Pentium 4 running Linux.
They could be made much faster using analytic derivatives, which would not be
hard to program, and probably also by using compiled code. A more sophisticated
algorithm could also help. We know the solution should be smooth on its support
and should have a density with respect to some product measure on c,w space.
Parameterizing the solution to reﬂect this knowledge should enable accurate ap-
proximations with many fewer free parameters.
4Available at http://lib.stat.cmu.edu/R/CRAN/
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Figure 3 shows the same kind of plot as Figure 2 — q(w | c) densities with
various values of c, log utility, and λ = .5. The difference is that here, instead of
showing the theoretical densities for the case where the q s (and hence necessarily
also g) have unbounded support, we show the numerically computed densities for
our case of a linearly increasing density with support [0,1]. The lines on the two
plots should not match exactly, because one shows a discretized approximation to
the solution for continuously distributed c and w, while the other shows an exact
solution for discretely distributed c and w. Nonetheless these conditional pdf’s do
match up, roughly. Note that in Figure 3 there are fewer lines shown, because the
discreteness and the bounded support for g mean that c does not have full support
even in [0,.5], as can be seen from Figure 4. In fact, with this degree of information
constraint, the solution sets c to .4 with probability .72.
To see the effects of varying degrees of risk aversion, consider calculations for






































The values of λ in the two examples we consider have been adjusted so that the
information ﬂow (.88 bits and .85 bits), is about the same for the two cases (λ = .5
and λ = 2, respectively) considered, so the differences in results are attributable
to the differences in the risk aversion parameters. Of course if the model were
formulated with an actual opportunity cost of information, in consumption goods
units, the solution with lower risk aversion would most likely imply a choice of
lower information ﬂow.
Shaded plots of the joint densities of c and w are shown in Figures 5 and 6. Both
solutions show discretization, with several values of c receiving zero probability.
The γ = .5 solution puts probability .70 on the highest value of c, which is .37.
The γ = 2 solution also puts probability .70 on its highest c value, but the value
is slightly lower — .34. The low risk-aversion solution shows a more discretized
distribution of c at lower values of w, and puts substantially more probability on
c values close to the c = w line. This is as would be expected. The γ = 2 utility
function goes to minus inﬁnity as w − c → 0o rc → 0. It therefore makes it
worthwhile to be well informed about low wealth values, so that c is not forced
14RATIONAL INATTENTION 15




















too close to zero, and also to keep the probability of choosing c close to w (and
hence w − c small) low.
With these non-log utility functions, we expect to see deviations from the F form
of q(w | c). Plots analogous to Figures 2 and 3 for these two non-log utility exam-
ples are shown in Figures 5 and 8. The high-risk-aversion plot shows narrow ﬁnite
support for q(w | c) at low values of c, and then very ﬂat tails on the pdf’s as we
move to higher c values. The lower-risk-aversion plot shows more of a right tail
and less narrow support at the low c values, and thin tails at higher c values except
for the highest, which in both plots is the one with the most weight. These results
make sense, with the higher risk aversion solution trading higher probability of
choosing a modest value of c when wealth is in fact high for a lower probability of
a mismatch between c and w when wealth is low.
The fact that discreteness in the distribution of c and ﬁnite support, varying with
c,i nq(w | c) show up in both these standard cases, despite a continuous marginal
distribution for w, implies that any numerical approach to solution of rational inat-
tention models must allow for these possibilities. They are not an artifact of the
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triangular g(w). That g(w) was chosen to bring out the differences with degree
of risk aversion, but the discreteness of the c distribution showed up with every g
I considered, including standard Beta, F, and Gamma pdf’s that peaked below .3
and were small or zero at w = 1.
While the discreteness will be a challenge for programmers, it may help the the-
ory rationalize observed patterns of behavior. Actual choices by individuals in
response to external information often do seem to have a discrete character.
V. OTHER POINTS ON THE RESEARCH FRONTIER
V.1. On to a fully dynamic non-LQG model. Here is the Bellman equation for a
dynamic programming problem with Shannon capacity as a constraint, the current





































f(c,w)dc = g(w), all w (15)
f(c,w) ≥ 0, all c,w (16)
H(C,W) ≤ κ . (17)
The function h maps the current c,w pair into a conditional density for next pe-
riod’s w. In usual models, it is speciﬁed indirectly in the form of an equation like
wt = φ(wt−1,ct−1,εt) together with a speciﬁcation that εt has a certain pdf and
is independent of wt−1 and ct−1. The constraint connecting f(c,w) to f(c | w) has
been left implicit. This problem is in the form of a standard dynamic programming
problem, except that the state and control variables are both in principle inﬁnite-
dimensional. But, extending the approach taken above to a two-period problem, I
believe computing solutions to such problems should be feasible. Economists are
already succeeding in calculating solutions to equilibrium models with inﬁnite-
dimensional state spaces.
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Note the occurrence of f(w | c) in the argument of the value function on the
right-handsidein(14). Thisreﬂectsthefactthattheagentmustallowsome“noise”
to affect the choice of c in the current period, but can use the noisy observation that
entered determination of c to update beliefs about next period’s w.
V.2. Rational inattention models of general equilibrium. The work cited earlier
by van Niewerburgh and Veldkamp and by Mondria includes calculation of mar-
ket equilibrium with capacity constraints. As already noted in section II, though,
these models assume costless and perfect observation of market prices, which is
both contrary to the notion of ﬁnite-capacity agents and a source of anomalous re-
sults. This modeling choice by these authors is not an easily corrected oversight.
Modeling a market equilibrium with agents who do not know exactly what prices
are requires being explicit about aspects of market microstructure that are not stan-
dard parts of the economic theory toolbox and about which we have few stylized
facts or modeling conventions to guide us.
A model populated by capacity-constrained agents will not simply balance sup-
ply and demand via a price mechanism. Agents will not have perfect knowledge
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of prices, indeed may have only a very rough idea of what they are, as they take
decisions that affect economic exchange and production. Inventories, retailers,
wholesalers, demand deposits, cash, and credit cards, are all devices that allow
agents to make transactions in which quantities and price are known and cho-
sen only approximately. Few of our models have explicit roles for retailers and
wholesalers, our models of inventory behavior are only modestly successful, and
microfounded models of money that connect to data are non-existent. The idea of
Shannon capacity may be of some help in modeling these phenomena, but they
are inherently difﬁcult, long-standing problems, so realistic general equilibrium
models with capacity-constrained agents may not emerge for some time.
V.3. Macro modeling. Since a standard approach to general equilibrium mod-
eling with rational inattention will not emerge soon, applying rational attention
to the representative agent equilibrium models that now constitute mainstream
macro will also take some time. In the meantime, though, we can see even from
simple linear-quadratic examples that there are implications for current modeling
practice. In the linear-quadratic framework, rational inattention behavior is a con-
strained special case of the behavior of an agent who observes state variables with
error. While there are some examples of such models in the macroeconomic litera-
ture (Lucas, 1973; Woodford, 2001), the rational inattention idea should encourage
us to pay more attention to such models. The objection that there is no physical
interpretation for the observation error such models postulate is answered by the
rational inattention framework, and the RI framework gives us some guidance as
to reasonable properties for the observation error, even when we cannot derive it
analytically.
V.4. Public and private information models. Recently, following the paper by
Morris and Shin (2002), there have been a number of papers considering models
with public and private information (Hellwig, 2004; Angeletos and Pavan, 2004).
This work raises interesting questions and arrives at conﬂicting conclusions about
the value of “transparency”, depending on assumptions about externalities that
are difﬁcult to calibrate against an actual economy. But for all the diversity in the
conclusions from this literature, it is all formulated on the assumption that there
are private information sources with exogenously given attributes and a public in-
formation source whose stochastic character we can imagine controlling. From a
rational inattention perspective, this is a strange setup. Capacity-limited agents
will act as if observing the state of the economy with error even if some public
authority announces it exactly. The amount of the error will depend both on the
stochastic properties of the state itself and of any noise in public signals about it. If
private signals carry a lot of information about privately important variables, in-
formation they contain about an aggregate state may be ignored or reacted to very
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slowly and erraticly5. Before these abstract models are applied to policy debates
about transparency in monetary policy, they need to be tied closely enough to real
economies that we can judge which of their conﬂicting conclusions might be cor-
rect, and this should include consideration of how their conclusions are affected
by rational inattention.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY POLICY
Rational inattention may have far-reaching implications for macroeconomics
and monetary policy generally, once its implications are fully worked out. In the
meantime, though, it may shed some light on transparency in monetary policy.
For a capacity-limited agent, it is necessary to take actions that respond to the true
state of the economy at a low information transmission rate. This means that reac-
tions to the state are either delayed and smoothed, with added idiosyncratic error,
or they are discretized and randomly timed. A central bank may provide the pub-
lic with a heavily ﬁltered view of its actions or judgments, on the assumption that
the public cannot take in the full detail and complexity of its actions and the think-
ing behind them. In the US, this takes the form of discretized, somewhat randomly
timed policy actions (changes in the Federal Funds rate) together with a brief para-
graph rationalizing the action. The paragraph occasionally changes the wording of
a phrase or two, and the market often reacts strongly to these changes. If enough
market participants take this simple, discrete sequence of changes in wording as
a free, low-bit-rate summary of an important state variable, it is unsurprising that
markets respond discretely to these changes in wording. Even market specialists,
who know the true state with high precision, will pay attention to the noise in the
Fed signal because of its effects on other agents.
If this is what is going on currently, what would be the effect of the Fed’s issuing
a much more detailed inﬂation report, like those issued periodically by inﬂation-
targeting banks? A naive extrapolation might suggest that since the Fed now pro-
vides very little information, which generates overreaction, overreaction would be
much worse if the Fed proved much more information. But this is unlikely. Mar-
ket participants who need a low-bit-rate summary of the state (of the economy, or
of the Fed’s policy stance) would still look for it, but there would not be a unique
low-bit-rate summary in the Fed’s own statements. Market participants who need
to devote most of their attention elsewhere will still respond noisily and with de-
lay to Fed statements, but the noise will come from other sources, probably many
other sources, instead of mainly from the Fed’s own efforts to provide a ﬁltered
5See Ma´ ckowiak and Wiederholt (2005) for a model with local and aggregate signals related to
pricing decisions and responded to with capacity constraints.
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signal. If there are enough other semi-public ﬁlterers of monetary news (TV, news-
papers, investment clubs, lunchtable conversation), the signal processing noise in
them may partially cancel out at the aggregate level. But even if not, the Fed would
no longer be itself responsible for generating unnecessary market ﬂuctuations.
There are other, in my view even stronger, arguments for transparency in mon-
etary policy. But a rational inattention perspective does help us understand why
it can be that economies where central banks publish detailed inﬂation reports do
not seem to have as much of a problem with overreaction to those reports as the
Fed does with overreaction to its single paragraphs.
VII. CONCLUSION
Abstract and single-agent models incorporating rational inattention are already
providing us with some useful insights. There is still a long and interesting road
ahead, though, before we can build models incorporating these insights that can
be matched to observed data, either at the macro or micro level.
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